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SYMPOSIUM
QUALITY ADVOCACY AND THE
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
THE ETHICS OF DILATORY MOTION PRACTICE:
TIME FOR CHANGE
THE HONORABLE DAVID N. EDELSTEIN*
One of the goals of the adversary system is to "secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action." Chief Judge Edelstein maintains
that a restriction on dilatory motion practice is needed to secure this goal. To
that end he proposes an amendment to the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity, the United States Judicial Code, and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE merits of the adversary system have not lost their freshness for
debate and continue to be the subject of much spirited discussion.
For example, the competence of advocates has been appraised by
members of the bench, and recommendations for improving the quality
of advocacy have been presented.' Additionally, whether the adver-
sary system places too much emphasis on gamesmanship and too little
stress on the ascertainment of truth has been debated at length. 2 This
Article does not seek to continue either of these important dialogues.
Rather, it is the intention of the author to provoke consideration of a
different aspect of our litigation process: the problem of delay resulting
from motion practice.
That motions can cause delay and can be employed for the purpose
of causing delay is no secret to the legal community. Yet despite this
*Chief Judge, Southern District of New York.
1. E.g., Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certification of
Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 Fordham L. Rev. 227 (1973); Kaufman, Does
the Judge Have a Right to Qualified Counsel?, 61 A.B.A.J. 569 (1975); Kaufman, The Court
Needs a Friend in Court, 60 A.B.A.J. 175 (1974). See also Sheran & Harmon, Minnesota Plan:
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education for Lawyers and Judges as a Condition for the MainLtain-
ing of Professional Licensing, 44 Fordham L. Rev. 1081 (1976); Widgery, The Compleat
Advocate, 43 Fordham L. Rev. 909 (1975); Wolkin, A Better Way to Keep Lawyers Competent,
61 A.B.A.J. 574 (1975).
2. E.g., Damaska, Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1083 (1975); Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, id. at 1031; Freedman, Judge
Frankers Search for Truth, id. at 1060; Uviller, The Advocate, The Truth, and Judicial Hackles:
A Reaction to Judge Frankel's Idea, id. at 1067.
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problem's substantial notoriety, it has received surprisingly little
treatment in legal journals or case law. It is in the belief that the
problem of delay should receive further consideration from the legal
community that this Article is written.
The advocate has at his disposal a broad spectrum of motions
which may be employed for a "myriad of uses ' 3 during the course of
litigation. Motion practice is available as a means of obtaining relief
from the court before, during, and after trial. For the advocate
practicing in the federal courts, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure4
specify a great number of distinct motions. Additionally, there are
established and recognized motions which are frequently made even
though not explicitly authorized by the Federal Rules. The motion for
reargument is one such motion.5
Assuredly, motion practice is vital to our adversary system. It is a
mechanism for bringing requests of counsel to the attention of the
court, and it facilitates the disposition of meritless cases6 and cases in
which there are no factual disputes. 7 However, motion practice can
produce the negative effect of retarding the judicial process. Every
motion requires the attention of the court, and if the number of hours
required to dispose of the motion exceeds the time available for its
consideration the court must postpone disposition of the motion. When
the litigation cannot proceed until the motion is resolved, the inevita-
ble result is that the final resolution of the dispute is delayed. 8
Delay of disposition is detrimental to the adversary system. In
criminal litigation, the Constitution demands speedy determinations of
guilt or innocence. 9 In civil litigation, there is no constitutional re-
quirement of promptness; however, victimized plaintiffs and innocent
defendants frequently have a strong interest in prompt relief or vindi-
cation. 10 Moreover, it is in the public interest to expedite litigations of
general concern and to maintain a system which stands ready and able
to "secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action."'"
3. 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1190, at 29 (1969).
4. 28 U.S.C. app., at 7729 (1970).
5. Fed. R. Civ. P. 83 authorizes the establishment of local court rules, which may authorize
additional motions. The motion for reargument, for example, is impliedly authorized by a local
rule of the Southern and Eastern Districts. S.D.N.Y. & E.D.N.Y. Gen. R. 9(m).
6. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), (c).
7. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
8. Steckler, Motions Prior to Trial, in Proceedings of the Seminar on Procedures for Effective
Judicial Administration, 29 F.R.D. 191, 299 (1961).
9. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
10. But see text accompanying notes 34-35 infra.
11. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (emphasis added); see 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 3, § 1182, at
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Given that delay is undesirable within the framework of the adver-
sary system, this Article will address two areas of concern regarding
the problem of delay, and then propose some methods of mitigating
that problem. The two areas are (1) the extent to which the adversary
system does limit motion-caused delay and (2) whether the adversary
system should further limit motion-caused delay.
II. THE EXTENT To WHICH THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM
DOES LIMIT MOTION-CAUSED DELAY
Before making any particular motion counsel typically might con-
sider various strategic factors: Is this particular motion the best means
of persuading the court to grant the desired relief? Should the motion
be made at this particular time? Is the benefit to the client worth the
time and expense involved in the motion? Will this motion, even if
granted by the court, have a negative impact on the litigation as a
whole, for example, by disclosing too much to opposing counsel?
In addition to weighing the above factors which relate directly to the
impact of the motion upon the client's interests, counsel must comply
with a variety of provisions which regulate the submission of dilatory
motions: the Judicial Code's provision allowing the taxation of exces-
sive costs upon counsel; 1 2 the ABA Code of Professional Responsibili-
ty's sections relating to vexatious delay and prejudice to the adminis-
tration of justice;13 and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure's provi-
sions relating to motions interposed for delay. 4
The Judicial Code supplies a deterrent to motion practice which
produces delay. Section 1927 of title 28 of the United States Code
provides that
Any attorney or other person... who so multiplies the proceedings in any case as to
increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy
personally such excess costs.
According to the language of section 1927, the court can tax costs only
upon an attorney whose motion practice increases costs unreasonably
and vexatiously; delay or intent to cause delay is not necessarily
sufficient. Because of the narrowness of the section and the problems
of proving vexatiousness, there have been no cases, to the author's
knowledge, where this statute has been used to tax costs against an
attorney solely for submitting dilatory motions.IS
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1970).
13. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility DR 1-102(A)(5), 7-102(A)(1) (1975).
14. Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(2), 11.
15. But cf. Gullo v. Hirst, 332 F.2d 178, 179 (4th Cir. 1964) (per curiam) (where there were
"serious questions of abuse of process," the court remanded with instructions "to tax the plaintiff
with reasonable counsel fees for the defendants' attorneys" and to "visit a proper sanction upon
the plaintiff's counsel.').
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The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility contains provisions
which address dilatory motion practice. 16 DR 1-102, entitled "Miscon-
duct," provides that "[a] lawyer shall not ... [e]ngage in conduct that
is prejudicial to the administration of justice.' 7 This provision cer-
tainly is applicable to any conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice. In fact, it is the breadth of the rule's prohibition which appears
to limit the provision's utility. It contains no standard for the determi-
nation of "prejudicial" conduct and hence is dependent upon other
ethical sources or upon ad hoc judicial determinations to supply a
standard.
Costs are taxed against an attorney only in extreme cases. Miles v. Dickson, 387 F.2d 716, 717
(5th Cir. 1967) (per curiam); see Weiss v. United States, 227 F.2d 72, 73 (2d Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 936 (1956). Such action requires a finding by the court that the attorney has
acted in bad faith. West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1092 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971); Coyne & Delany Co. v. G.W. Onthank Co., 10 F.R.D. 435, 436
(S.D. Iowa 1950); see Miles v. Dickson, supra, at 717. It is presumed that the attorney has acted
in good faith. Coyne & Delany Co. v. G.W. Onthank Co., supra, at 436. The imposition of costs
is within the trial judge's discretion, Brislin v. Killanna Holding Corp., 85 F.2d 667, 671 (2d Cir.
1936), and judges may be reluctant to find that members of the bar have acted In bad faith.
Perhaps another reason for judicial reluctance to assess these costs is that the assessment might
require notice and a separate hearing resulting in more wasted time and money. See Hanley v.
Condrey, 467 F.2d 697, 700 (2d Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
In two cases in which costs were taxed against an attorney, the assessment was not based upon
the attorney's dilatory tactics. In one case, repeated serious breaches of the Canons of Ethics by
an attorney with a long history of such conduct led the court to assess costs against the attorney.
Kiefel v. Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc., 404 F.2d 1163, 1165-71 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 908 (1969). In an earlier case, costs were taxed against an attorney who obstructed the
taking of a deposition; the attorney's acts were of such a nature that the trial court initiated
contempt proceedings against him. Toledo Metal Wheel Co. v. Foyer Bros. & Co., 223 F. 350,
357-58 (6th Cir. 1915).
16. In the federal courts, the local court rules often provide that attorneys admitted to
practice before these courts are subject to the disciplinary provisions of the ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility. E.g., D.C. Conn. R. 2; S.D.N.Y. & E.D.N.Y. Gen. R. 5(0.
But see W.D.N.Y. R. 4. These rules provide that disciplinary proceedings are to be instituted by
complaint to the Chief Judge of the district court. See also Standing Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, R. of Proc. 10, in ABA Code of Professional Responsibility 65C
(1975).
The ABA Code is also applicable to state court proceedings. E.g., N.Y. Judiciary L., app. at
351 (McKinney 1975). Presently, disciplinary proceedings in New York are instituted by
complaint to a local bar association. Serious charges are brought before the bar group's committee
on grievances. This committee may then file formal charges with the appellate division of the
Supreme Court of New York. See N.Y. Judiciary L. § 90 (McKinney 1968); N.Y. Court Rules,
Ist Dep't, § 603.4 (McKinney 1975); 2d Dep't, id. § 691.4; 3d Dep't, id. § 800.28; 4th Dep't, id.
§ 1022.19, .20. The Association of the Bar of the City of New York recently proposed substantial
changes to this grievance procedure. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Ad Hoc
Comm. on Grievance Procedures, Report on the Grievance System (1976); see N.Y. Times, Feb.
4, 1976, at 1, col. 1; 175 N.Y.L.J., Feb. 4, 1976, at 1, col. 2.
17. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility DR 1-102(A)(5) (1975).
DILATORY MOTION PRACTICE
Another Code provision presents a more useful standard for deter-
mining when dilatory motions may not be submitted. DR 7-102
provides in part:
(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:
(1) File a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other
action on behalf of his client when he knows or when it is obvious that such
action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another.' 8
Assuming that delay of any portion of the litigation process and not
just of the trial can be considered a form of harassment, 19 counsel is
required by the Code to insure that no motion is made merely to harass
through delay. However, counsel apparently is not prohibited from
submitting a motion which has multiple purposes; so long as at least
one of those purposes is not to harass through delay, such a motion
would not be designed "merely" to harass. Furthermore, the rule does
not restrict motions which are not intentionally dilatory, or even
motions that are intentionally dilatory but are not aimed at harass-
ment.
Through the general language of rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure20 and various more particularized provisions,2 ' the Federal
Rules attempt to regulate dilatory litigation tactics. Rule 56 speaks to
summary judgment affidavits presented "solely for the purpose of
delay." 22 Rule 11 speaks to pleadings "interposed for delay. '23 Other
provisions restrict delay less directly. 24
Rule 7(b)(2) speaks indirectly to the submission of dilatory motions.
18. Id. DR 7-102(A)(1) (emphasis added); see American College of Trial Lawyers, Code of
Trial Conduct (rev. 1972): "Every effort consistent with the legitimate interests of the client
should be made to expedite litigation and to avoid unnecessary delays, and no dilatory tactics
should be employed for the purpose of harassing an adversary or of exerting economic pressure on
him." Id. rule 21(a). "A lawyer should never employ dilatory tactics of any kind to procure more
fees." Id. rule 23(g).
19. This assumption is made because the Code rule directly addresses only delay of the
trial itself.
20. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 provides: "These rules govern the procedure in the United States
district courts . . . . They shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action."
21. See notes 22-25 infra and accompanying text.
22. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(g). This rule provides for the imposition of costs on the party
responsible for the delay. E.g., Clark v. Hancock, 45 F.R.D. 512, 514-15 (S.D. Ga. 1968);
Munson Line, Inc. v. Green, 6 F.R.D. 470, 474-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). With respect to the attorney
at fault, the rule provides only for contempt proceedings.
23. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
24. See also Fed. R. App. P. 46(c), under which an attorney may be disciplined for filing an
appeal solely for the purpose of delay, or for failing to prosecute the appeal with due diligence.
See United States v. Eng, 527 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Alexander, 521 F.2d 794
(9th Cir. 1975); In re Bithoney, 486 F.2d 319 (1st Cir. 1973).
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It provides that "[tihe rules applicable to captions, signing, and other
matters of form of pleadings apply to all motions and other papers
provided for by these rules." '25
On its face this provision appears to be concerned only with matters
of form. In fact, however, rule 7(b)(2) incorporates what is potentially a
potent sanction against delay. One of the "rules applicable to captions,
signing, and other matters of form of pleadings" is rule 11. That rule
provides in pertinent part:
SIGNING OF PLEADINGS
Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one
attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated. . . . The
signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading;
that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to
support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading is not signed or is
signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be stricken as sham and
false and the action may proceed as though the pleading had not been served. For a
wilful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary
action.
26
Under rule 7(b)(2), then, motions are subject to the same certification
requirements as are pleadings under rule 11. If a motion is not signed
or is signed in order to circumvent the purpose of the rule, the court
may summarily strike or reject the motion. In either case, if the
attorney acted intentionally the court may impose disciplinary sanc-
tions.
Although rule 7(b)(2)'s incorporation of rule 11 does provide the
federal adversary system with a mechanism for restricting dilatory
motions, several limitations on this mechanism should be recognized.
First, rule 7(b)(2) does not reach motions which are not purposefully
dilatory, but affects only motions "interposed for delay. ' ' 27
Second, even if the motion were purposely dilatory, there is a
reasonable possibility that the rule 11 standard would not prohibit it
unless it were interposed solely for delay. 28 Rule 7(b)(2) would then
reach only slightly further than DR 7-102,29 although the additional
remedy of striking or rejecting the motion would be available. Finally,
rule 7(b)(2) apparently has never been utilized to restrict intentional
delay; the author has not found a single judicial decision considering
rule 7(b)(2) as it relates to delay.
There are at least four plausible explanations for the absence of case
law considering rule 7(b)(2) as a sanction against delay. First, lawyers
25. Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(2).
26. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (emphasis added).
27. Id.
28. See 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 3, § 1334, at 501-03 (discussing rule 11).
29. See text accompanying notes 18-20 supra.
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may be reluctant to challenge their adversaries' use of dilatory tactics.
Second, when the motion can be disposed of on the merits, courts may
be reluctant to base their decisions on the motivations of a party or his
counsel. Third, difficulty in proving an attorney's purpose in submit-
ting a motion may have led the bench and bar to abandon the rule
rather than cope with this hard question of fact. Finally, and most
likely, the provision itself is presented too obscurely. The rule's head-
ing does not even suggest that the provision is addressed to delay, and
the provision on its face appears concerned only with requirements of
form. Perhaps a more obvious sanction would be employed more
frequently.
None of these explanations is wholly satisfactory; but although it
may be unclear why the courts have not considered rule 7(b)(2), it is
clear that the rule has had no force or effect as a delay-controlling
provision.
In sum, the provisions in the Judicial Code, 30 the ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility,3 t and the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure,32 apparently have not been invoked. The existing scheme of
procedural and ethical rules does not significantly restrict the submis-
sion of delay-producing motions. 33
III. WHETHER THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM SHOULD
FURTHER LIMIT MOTION-CAUSED DELAY
The next inquiry is whether the adversary system should attempt to
place further limits on motion-caused delay. The resolution of this
inquiry depends upon a balancing of the public's interest in the prompt
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1970); see text accompanying note 15 supra.
31. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-102(A)(1) (1975); see text accompanying
notes 18-20 supra. See also DR 1-102, quoted at text accompanying note 17 supra.
32. Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(2), 11; see text accompanying notes 25-28 supra. See also notes 20-24
supra and accompanying text.
33. It appears that federal judges have inherent power to discipline attorneys. In re Abrams,
521 F.2d 1094, 1101 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 574 (1975) (There is "an absolute and
unfettered power of the district court to admit and to discipline members of its bar independently
of and separately from admission and disciplinary procedures of (a) the state courts and (b) this
court."); see, e.g., Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 512 (1873); Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 529 (1824); Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 571 (2d Cir. 1975); Cord v. Smith,
338 F.2d 516, 524 (9th Cir. 1964); Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209, 214-15
(N.D. III. 1975). Chief Justice Burger recently stated that "the federal courts have plenary power
over the admission, disbarment, or discipline of attorneys who practice before them." United
States Dist. Ct. v. Abrams, 96 S. Ct. 574, 575 (1975), denying cert. to In re Abrams, supra
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also Schlesinger v. Teitelbaum, 475 F.2d 137, 141-42 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1111 (1973) ("[T]he Supreme Court of the United States has recognized the
inherent power of [district] courts to take appropriate action to secure the just and prompt
disposition of cases."). It is unclear whether this inherent judicial power is any broader than the
judiciary's power under current statutes and rules.
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resolution of disputes against the public's interest in less restricted
advocacy. It should be observed that this balancing process may not be
cast in terms of the interest of the client versus that of the public:
apples cannot be compared with oranges.
The argument against the institution of more restrictive measures
cannot be simply that the adversary system should not limit the ability
of counsel to protect their clients in every way possible. As has been
discussed, the status quo already imposes guidelines with respect to
when and how motions may be brought, and with respect to certain
aspects of professional conduct. A similar argument against such
measures is that any restriction on counsel's ability to submit certain
motions would alter counsel's long-established apportionment of duties
to the client on one hand and to the public on the other. Without
considering the logic of such a contention, it may simply be observed
that no such argument is sufficient unless it includes a justification of
the present apportionment of duties.
The strongest argument against the institution of further restrictions
upon the submission of dilatory motions appears to be that society's
interest in independent and unhindered representation-which might
be impaired by restrictions on dilatory motions-outweighs any benefit
to be gained from curtailing delay. It remains to be seen whether the
balance struck by this argument is convincing.
Two distinct situations in which a motion submitted results in delay
warrant consideration. In the first, the client stands to benefit directly
from delay. For example, a plaintiff who has obtained a preliminary
injunction, 34 and thus has already demonstrated a likelihood of pre-
vailing on the merits, 35 might nonetheless decide that it is to his benefit
to prolong the protection of the provisional remedy by postponing a
decision on the merits. Similarly, a defendant may stand to gain
directly from prolongation of the litigation where the relief sought is
prospective only, or where the relief sought would include interest on a
damages judgment and the judgment rate of interest is lower than the
rate of return the defendant can obtain, for example, on an invest-
ment. 36 The motion in this scenario is made primarily to delay, but
will, if granted, garner a non-delay benefit to the client. Thus, the
motion purposefully retards the legal process, but still is not proscribed
by the existing provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 37
Counsel probably need not be concerned with other regulatory provi-
sions either. 38
34. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a).
35. See 7 J. Moore, Federal Practice 65.04[1], at 65-39 (2d ed. 1975).
36. For other objectives of dilatory tactics see Steckler, supra note 8, at 311.
37. See text accompanying notes 17-20 supra.
38. See text accompanying notes 15, 22-28 supra.
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In the second situation, delay is not the primary goal of the motion,
but counsel has reason to believe, or perhaps is even certain, that
bringing the motion will result in unintentional delay of the litigation.
In the first situation-where the motion is made primarily to
delay-the opponent of restrictions on dilatory motions first is logically
compelled to argue that delay itself is legitimate. In so arguing, he may
not contend that because dilatory motions are subject only to minimal
restrictions, delay itself is pro tanto a legitimate objective. Rather, he
must contend that it is desirable and appropriate to sacrifice the
public's interest in prompt resolution of disputes in favor of the
public's interest in less restricted representation of clients. The author
rejects this contention, however, in the belief that it is an indisputable
abuse of the judicial process, and injurious to the public and some-
times to the innocent party as well, to employ devices purposefully
directed at hampering the judicial process.
The second situation-where the motion is not primarily for
delay-is somewhat more difficult to analyze. As stated previously, the
opponent of a more restrictive system may not argue, without more,
that the present procedural and ethical rules permit certain procedural
devices, and that therefore any further delay-curtailing restrictions are
undesirable simply because they limit access to those devices. Rather,
he must argue that the effect of the limitation would be to inappropri-
ately restrict advocacy, and that this effect would be philosophically
inconsistent with his view of an optimal adversary system.
I suggest, and I believe that many of those who intuitively disap-
prove of further restrictions would agree, that there could be a
situation where the unintentional delay would be so great and the
non-delay gain to the client so minimal that the submission of the
motion should be deterred. 39 It is not difficult to imagine, for example,
a discovery motion whose disposition would require extensive respon-
sive argumentation by the respondent, consideration by the court of
large numbers of legal arguments and great amounts of documenta-
tion, and perhaps an evidentiary hearing. Further, the movant in this
hypothetical situation might know or reasonably expect that the infor-
mation to be obtained if the motion is granted will be of almost no use
to his client's case. Finally, the movant might know or reasonably
expect that the submission of the motion will result in substantial delay
to the litigation. If such an extreme case can be imagined, and if
reasonable men can agree upon the proper resolution of such a case,
then some further restriction upon the submission of such motions
which unintentionally result in delay is appropriate.
39. Although for convenience reference is made to the client's gain, it must be remembered
that the issue is the public's interest in less restricted advocacy. It should also be noted that the
client's delay gain, in contrast to his non-delay gain, is never considered.
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IV. PROPOSALS
It is the author's conclusion that, first, delay is not a legitimate
objective of motion practice, and, second, in certain circumstances it is
appropriate to disallow the submission of a motion even where delay is
not the object. The procedural and ethical rules which govern motion
practice in our adversary system can be amended to implement these
two conclusions.
The current statutory provision taxing an attorney for excessive
costs can easily be amended to incorporate these conclusions. To
incorporate the first conclusion-that delay is not a legitimate
objective-language may simply be appended to the present section.
The new section 1927 of the Judicial Code40 would then provide:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United
States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case as to
increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy
personally such excess costs. Costs resulting from the submission of a motion intended
primarily for delay are such costs.
The author recognizes that under this amended version of section
1927, as in the other proposed provisions which follow, proving intent
will not be easy and might consume substantial court time and may
even cause delay. In response to the criticism that it would be unwise
to institute a scheme which would increase delay, it is submitted that,
first, there will be many cases where the determinations of fact will be
less time-consuming than the disposition of the motion on the merits,
and, second, and perhaps more important, the existence of the pro-
scription may have a substantial deterrent effect.
Implementing the second conclusion-that dilatory motions should
be disallowed in certain circumstances even when delay is not the
object of the motion-requires first that a standard be articulated. The
standard should require actual or constructive knowledge on the part
of counsel that the motion will result in substantial delay and that,
even if granted, the motion will secure very insubstantial relief for the
client. Adding this standard, the Judicial Code provision would then
read:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court . . . may be
required by the court to satisfy personally such excess costs. Costs resulting from the
submission of a motion (1) intended primarily for delay, or (2) where the attorney knew
or should have known that substantial delay would result and that if granted the
motion would secure very insubstantial relief are such costs.
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1970).
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The Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-102 similarly may be
modified to implement the two conclusions previously enunciated.
With the addition of language like that employed to revise section
1927 of the Judicial Code, DR 7-102 would provide:
DR 7-102 Representing a Client Within the Bounds of the Law.
(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:
(1) File a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other
action . . ..
(1.5) Submit a motion intended primarily for delay or where the lawyer knows or
should know that substantial delay will result and that if granted the motion
will secure very insubstantial relief.
(2) Knowingly advance a claim ....
The dilatory motion provision contained in the Federal Rules4' has
not been utilized, but even if it had been, it does not go far enough.
The problem of disuse hopefully can be mitigated by adopting a
self-contained rule identified as dealing with delay, in contrast to
current rule 7(b)(2), entitled "Motions and Other Papers," which
cryptically incorporates rule 11, entitled "Signing of Pleadings." The
very fact that such an explicit provision would be included in the
Federal Rules should diminish any reluctance on the part of the bench
or bar to utilize the provision. The problem of scope can be obviated
by incorporating into the rule the above-enumerated standards pro-
posed to be added to the provisions of the Judicial Code and the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
Current rule 7(b)(2), through rule 11, includes both procedural and
disciplinary sanctions. Although retention of the disciplinary sanction
is somewhat superfluous in light of the proposed modification of DR
7-102, it emphasizes the seriousness of the conduct proscribed by the
rule.
With these points in mind, the proposed rule of procedure might
provide as follows:
RULE 7.5
DILATORY MOTIONS
The court may treat as a nullity any motion which is (1) submitted primarily for
delay, or (2) submitted by an attorney who knows or should know that substantial
delay will result and that the motion if granted will secure very insubstantial relief.
The court may impose disciplinary sanctions in an appropriate case.
I have no doubt that other minds may disagree with the analysis
employed in this Article and may disapprove of the precise method of
implementation which has been suggested. Nevertheless, the analysis
41. Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(2).
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is presented to stimulate consideration of a problem within our adver-
sary system. The proposals are presented as an illustration of how the
results of the analysis, or of a similar analysis, might be implemented.
The problem of delay deserves attention. If this Article illumines
that problem or raises questions about the problem in the minds of
some of the legal community, then it and I will have served our
purpose.
